

**:A History of Violence**  
**Evolution of Counterinsurgency Strategies and Tactics**  
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Excessive and unnecessary violence that is not directed against and restricted to achieving military objectives has been a perennial feature of warfare throughout history, as indicated by evidence of mass killing in primitive societies. Theories of war atrocities explored in the previous chapter offer valuable insights into the causes of such violence. The rise of the first agrarian civilizations created differences between sedentary and nomadic societies.<sup>i</sup> The difficulties of peaceful coexistence between these two types of societies have led to some severe forms of violence, for example, in the case of the Romans and the Chinese civilizations against their nomad neighbors, the Huns, who "ground almost the whole of Europe into the dust"<sup>ii</sup>, or the havoc Mongols wrecked on much of Asia and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, not all cases of war atrocities are explainable by differences in lifestyles. Slaughter and enslavement in the Peloponnesian Wars in Ancient Greece, the destruction of Carthage by Rome during the Third Punic War, or the sack and mass killing in Jerusalem following its capture during the First Crusade demonstrate that similarities in lifestyle, even culture and race, cannot stop gruesome violence.

Empire, domination of one society by another through military force, is an ancient phenomenon whose origins go back to the creation of the first agrarian civilizations. Empire-making always came with challenges over control, legitimacy, consent of the ruled, and notions of legality. Some of the most notable war atrocities took place in connection with the territorial expansion and imperial policing. Assyrian, Persian, and Roman empires in the ancient world were all ruthless in their suppression campaigns against internal rebels who would have suffered from enslavement, mass deportation, flaying, and other gruesome ways of punishment.<sup>iii</sup>

Still, material factors are seldom enough to explain the forces that drive men toward committing colossal scales of violence against others. It is often the case that human beings, as well as societies, need to feel they are doing the right thing even when they are committing mass murder and genocide. The blatant hatred that characterizes the worst cases of war atrocities is not only fed by the need for territorial expansion and access to new sources of wealth but also by the differences in moral values, social mores, and religio-ideological beliefs. Thus, many other theories of war atrocities that emphasize the role of ideological or racial/civilizational stereotypes in the justification and facilitation of unconstrained violence rightly point out that such factors help human societies to accept total annihilation and genocide as something natural, even necessary.

However, one problem with understanding war atrocities only in terms of the hatred generated by different lifestyles and the resultant divergent moral values, social prejudices, and religio-cultural bigotries is that it only explains the atrocities, not the war.<sup>iv</sup> Where do the state power and the wars they wage fit in? The question is worth asking because many of the most horrendous cases of massive violence throughout history have happened by the direct agency or active support of the state powers within the context of an armed conflict.

Moral, ideological, religious, and legal systems do three things. First, they define a natural, divine, or lawful state of affairs (order) to which all human beings and societies must abide. In the case of war, this order determines what kinds of military conflicts are legitimate/rightful or illegitimate/wrongful. Both Christian and Islamic traditions developed rules about the types of wars that were deemed just, which mainly consisted of self-defense and campaigns waged to conquer heathen lands.<sup>v</sup> In many other contexts, the military clashes among city-states, ancient and medieval republics, dynastic kingdoms or empires, and states<sup>vi</sup> were regarded as natural, while wars waged by nomadic tribes, heathen and heterodox communities, or uprisings by lower social classes were not. Many ancient, medieval, and modern cultures developed strong norms against insurgency because it was believed to disturb the natural, divine, or lawful order.<sup>vii</sup>

Second, moral and legal systems assign each individual or group a status that is ordained, although not fixed under all circumstances, for them in an ideal state of affairs. This status creates a hierarchy that defines each individual and group's rights and responsibilities within the context of the desired order. Socio-economic hierarchies (class relations) in societies and racial/civilizational hierarchies among them are generated and sustained not only by material realities of inequality in terms of power and wealth but also by ideational notions of moral, intellectual, and cultural superiority/inferiority. In many cases, throughout history, the conceptual and even lingual tools devised to institutionalize and justify unequal class relations in domestic contexts closely mirror those that serve the same function in international relations.

Many cultures throughout history have been willing to abide by certain norms and rules of chivalry in their hostilities with respectable/recognized enemies. Nevertheless, they have seldom been ready to extend the same treatment to unrespectable/unrecognized enemies, like barbarian tribes and races, members of heterodox religious

sects, or internal rebels who were deemed to threaten the venerated socio-economic order. These two types of hostilities usually follow different sets of methods, principles, and approaches. The wicked image of the slave and peasant rebels, revolts of religious and ethnic minorities on the fringes of empires, or racial and tribal resistance toward imperial expansion and rule in ancient and medieval historiographies were seldom reproduced in case of insurgencies led by disgruntled members of the ruling elites such as princes of the monarchical families, feudal barons or other rebels among the privileged social classes or races.

Finally, moral and legal systems develop rules of propriety that define proper behavior and acceptable ways and means of doing things and regulate appropriate relationships among the members of the same group or among them and other groups. Individuals and groups will be judged and treated according to the standards and prescriptions contained in these rules of propriety. Violating such rules will be met with moral censure and legal sanctions. Those sanctions or punishments can sometimes take the form of withholding reciprocal treatment according to the established rules and norms from the violating party. For example, although much of the rules and customs of war were shaped in pragmatic responses to necessities of reciprocity, they are still, at their core, rules of propriety expected to be followed by all the belligerents if they wish to retain the status of the lawful combatant. Failing to observe the laws and customs of war could lead to legal sanctions in the shape of denying the rights and privileges accrued to lawful combatants.

In the ancient and medieval periods, it was not uncommon for nomadic invasions from abroad or local resistance against the imperial rule to be carried out in the form of large-scale and well-organized military operations using conventional weapons and tactics. Yet, they often tended to be in the form of irregular, guerrilla forms of warfare due to asymmetries of power and resources. This would entail methods of conflict that contrasted with those of wars among polities with similar economic and social structures and conventional ways of war. Differences in fighting styles and a strong sense of the immorality of irregular warfare tactics and methods would hugely affect an enemy's image and result in different treatments.

The status of the insurgent, throughout history and across geographical and cultural boundaries, was (and still is) affected by such fundamental notions about what is just war, who has the right to wage it,

and how it should be conducted on the battlefield. It is not surprising to see mystified stories of rebellions that have been commended because of the heroic actions of the rebels or praiseworthy causes they championed. This, however, does not change the overwhelmingly negative attitudes developed in almost every moral-legal system against revolt. The problem is not merely that when an order is regarded as essentially just and rightful, no kind of rebellion against it could be warranted; a more important consideration that profoundly affects attitudes and judgments toward insurgents and how they should be treated is what social classes or races revolt, what socio-political causes they espouse and how they conduct their rebellions militarily.

### Transition Toward Modern Counterinsurgency

Before the 18<sup>th</sup> century, class and racial prejudices affected how the enemy was perceived and treated. Both Christian and secular notions of unjust war had direct references to peasant revolts or colonial resistance against the European powers; still, the ways of conducting war had not yet established an immediate association with notions about the legitimacy of the war or the legal status of the warriors. The late 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> centuries were the periods during which the essentially moral-political formation of the modern European state came into being. This particular type of political organization based on sovereign, territorial units claimed independence from higher sources of authority both inside and outside their borders. One of the central attributes of the modern state was its monopoly of the use of force that had huge implications, at least theoretically, for notions of legitimate war and rightful warriors since it established war as a clash of arms between states, rendering the involvement of non-state actors in warfare problematic. Furthermore, the rise of the modern state coincided with the military revolution of the early modern age.<sup>viii</sup> Technological advances and the more extensive use of firepower on the battlefields necessitated the reorganization and restructuring of the armies in a way that could best accommodate the changes in the conduct of warfare.

Local resistance against imperial rule, both on the fringes of land empires or overseas colonies, remained the main form of insurgency in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Both socio-economic grievances and proto-nationalist and religious motivations were leading to rebellion in various empires and states of the day. The Chinese empire witnessed insurgencies by the minority

ethnic/racial and religious groups in Tibet and Xinjiang. At approximately the same time, the Kurds and Afghans rose against the Ottoman and Safavid Empires in the Middle East.<sup>ix</sup> Pugachev's revolution in the 1770s Russian empire was motivated by both socio-economic and religious reasons.<sup>x</sup>; while the French waged a violent counterinsurgency against the minority Protestant population in the south of the country during the early years of the century.<sup>xi</sup>

In the New World colonies, the revolt of slaves against colonial masters was one of the most frequent causes of unrest, as evidenced by the 1739 Stono rebellion in South Carolina. Brutality and excessive violence in the form of mass execution of the captured rebels, looting and burning of civilian properties, and torture was common in suppressing such revolts. The British and French colonialists resorted to drastic measures such as burning the rebels alive and mass slaughtering all slave populations to put down these insurgencies.<sup>xii</sup> The first significant instance of forced population resettlement as a counterinsurgency measure occurred in the same period when Britain relocated both the French settlers and native Canadian tribes from Nova Scotia in 1755.<sup>xiii</sup>

In many cases, there was no significant divergence in the fighting styles of the insurgents and counterinsurgents. Although insurgents could be inferior to their opponents in terms of organization and resources, they used conventional arms, tactics, and methods to engage with governments. However, there were also important instances of irregular warfare and guerrilla insurgencies. Subjected East European nations rose against the Ottoman Empire during its 1770s wars with Russia that turned unusually bloody due to both the guerrilla tactics of the insurgents and its simultaneity with a foreign conflict.<sup>xiv</sup> Polish resistance against the Swedish Empire, the Bavarian uprising against the Hapsburg empire, and the challenge that the French occupying army faced in the Spanish War of Succession, all at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, also relied on irregular methods of fighting.<sup>xv</sup> Guerrilla warfare did not remain confined to the European context as the French settlers, and their native Canadian allies turned to the same tactics in resisting the British during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763).<sup>xvi</sup>

One implication of the alleged revolution in military affairs was that European armies developed the means and methods of regular warfare, such as reliance on heavy forces, rigid formations, and firepower. These developments were the anticipated results of states' control of military

forces that ended in more effective and economic management of war resources, more intensive training of the recruits, and growing expectations of discipline on their parts as the war objectives and motivations changed from heated ideological and faith-related issues to more limited political and dynastic ones. In this context, the irregular methods of conducting war formed a mutually reinforcing relationship with earlier class and racially charged notions of illegitimate war. Still, it was too early to stigmatize all forms of irregular methods and tactics of conducting armed conflict as it has not yet become entirely associated with non-state armed groups or the so-called "savage" people. Light infantry and cavalry, maneuverability, surprise attacks, and ambushes were still much valued as supplements to the European powers' military strategies both in their wars with each other and in their colonial conquests.<sup>xvii</sup> An essential aspect of this phenomenon is that irregular units operating in the service of conventional European armies were fighting in undisciplined and savage ways that usually entailed committing atrocities against innocent civilians or incapacitated enemy combatants. For example, the English officers who encountered the Austrian Pandours in the middle of the century described them as a "murderous mob who mocked the laws of war".<sup>xviii</sup>

Even writers who have reservations about the validity of the civilization standard in studying war atrocities, such as Sibylle Scheipers, admit that the first signs of the emerging conceptual distinction between the regular and irregular were tied to the experiences in colonial warfare.<sup>xix</sup> The distinction served to differentiate the methods and rules of conducting continental wars among the civilized European states and colonial conquests and policing in the peripheries of the European state system. "The American way of war," which referred to the characteristics and conditions of armed confrontations between the European colonial armies or settlers and North American natives during the campaigns of the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, denoted unlimited, unrestraint war as opposed to the limited nature of the European conflicts. Such warfare was directed toward total annihilation of the enemy and cruel war practices that left no space for restraint and moderation.<sup>xx</sup>

The conceptual distinction between the regular and irregular owed much to the fact that the European colonizers contrasted the unique characteristics of war with the "uncivilized", "savage", and "backward" colonial subjects to those of war among conventional European armies. The racial and civilizational stereotypes about non-European and non-Christian people led to the claim that their irregular forms of warfare are attributable

to their level of cultural and moral progress; thus, the tactics and methods of European war-making should be adapted to the necessities of fighting with them. George Washington had once asserted that only Indians could match Indians, which meant that making war upon native Americans should have followed certain rules and practices, and if the Europeans wanted to defeat their native enemies, they should have abandoned their moral scruples and laws of war.<sup>xxi</sup>

There were, generally speaking, two problems with this irregular/savage form of warfare. First, the general view among the European colonizers was that the natives did not treat their European captives with dignity; thus, they did not deserve reciprocity. There is evidence that this view had less to do with racial prejudices than genuine concerns about particular practices in conducting the war. General Wolf, who commanded the British armies in the Seven Years' Wars (1756-1763) in North America against the French, forbade his soldiers from swearing and scalping the captured enemies unless they were natives or Frenchmen who wore the native customs, which indicated their willingness to adopt Indian fighting tactics.<sup>xxii</sup>

Racial prejudices and stereotypes about the "savage" people affected the second problem more vividly. The Indian soldiers attached to regular European armies were regarded as hopelessly undisciplined. In 1757, the Indian allies of the French colonists in North America cruelly slaughtered the surrendered English soldiers at Fort William Henry against the orders of their European superiors. Irregular units comprised of European settlers were almost as unruly and unreliable as the Indians in sacking, burning, destroying houses, and killing cattle.<sup>xxiii</sup> Yet, racial prejudices and cultural stereotypes led to the opinion that the European irregulars and mercenaries could be controlled,<sup>xxiv</sup> while the Indians could not.

The 18<sup>th</sup> century was the moment that the first signs of stigmatization of irregular forms of warfare and its association with lower levels of civilization and racial stereotypes began to emerge. This moral revulsion toward the methods and tactics attributed to irregular war was partly a product of the consolidation of central control over the military establishments and the evolution of regular forms and tactics of war. Nonetheless, the European states of the period were keenly aware that some of the shocking methods of indisciplined and unpredictable irregular units could be highly effective in war situations. The uncertainty over the primacy of legitimacy and discipline in the war led to ambiguity in



condemning irregular methods and tactics of conducting war; while the European states were accusing their colonial and even internal insurgents for their barbarous war tactics, they would take advantage of the same means whenever it suited them.

## The Birth of Modern Counterinsurgency

The COIN literature is obsessed with locating the origins of modern counterinsurgency at around the age of democratic revolutions of the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, with the American revolution, the Vendee rebellion against the revolutionary regime in France, and the Spanish resistance against Napoleon's occupation being identified as the first major examples of modern insurgency and counterinsurgency.<sup>xxv</sup> Before the democratic revolutions, all types of insurgents against political authority, internal or external (rebel peasants or colonial savages), were treated as unlawful combatants excluded from the protections of the laws of war; the criteria, however, were flexible to changing conditions in each context that was the result of uncertainties in the most of the 18<sup>th</sup> century about the effectiveness and legitimacy of irregular forms of warfare.

The American and French revolutions tried to introduce new political criteria of exclusion to distinguish various categories of rebels according to perceptions about the legitimacy of their grievances against established authority. While the American War of Independence was not very much different from the old anti-imperial insurgencies, the influence of Enlightenment ideals of freedom, national self-determination, and popular participation in the political system created in its aftermath made it a modern revolution in the eyes of historians. Militarily, the War of Independence was, for the most part, a conventional clash between the well-organized army of the patriots and the British colonial forces in which both used almost the same tactics and weapons.<sup>xxvi</sup>

The American patriots were traitors and rebels in the eyes of the British crown, yet the British government was reluctant to commit itself in an official way to a policy regarding captured rebel soldiers as these matters were largely left to the discretion of the field commanders. Both sides resorted to a language against one another that was usually reserved for justifying brutality against the natives, but as Betsy Knight argues, throughout the war, the British colonial authorities carried out no significant case of mass trial or execution for treason against their captured

enemies, and despite some exceptions, they continued to be treated like war prisoners.<sup>xxvii</sup> The willingness on the part of both American patriots and the British to exercise restraint could have been due to racial and political factors stemming from common blood and shared faith in the same political values. A more important reason, however, might be that the American revolutionary army acted professionally and conventionally. Notwithstanding occasional deviations toward guerrilla tactics throughout years of war, there was a deliberate policy of keeping the essentially conventional nature of the campaign. As John Shy explains: "By being militarily conventional, American revolutionary created at least the illusion of unified purpose, military strength and political respectability" which was not surprising given George Washington's longstanding suspicion toward irregular fighters as "undependable, undisciplined and coward under fire".<sup>xxviii</sup>

The French revolution overturned the traditional distinction of civilian/combatant in early modern customary international law by its institution of popular mobilization. The benefits gained by mobilizing all social classes to serve national goals came at the expense of command hierarchy and discipline. However, when the revolutionary fervor subsided, the necessity for curbing instances of indiscipline and insubordination among the ranks of the popular army led to a counter-trend toward professionalization that strengthened the earlier contempt for irregular fighters and warfare. Alongside the questions of command and discipline, the politicization of the militaries was another impact of the French revolution on war.<sup>xxix</sup> The infiltration of political ideologies, beliefs and values and their concomitant Manichean worldviews into military organizations created tensions, in the decades and centuries to come, with the professional requirements that would guarantee respect for the laws of war in treating the enemy combatants and civilians.

Indeed, the French revolutionaries entertained, for some time, the idea that the nationality of the enemy can be a significant criterion in determining his status as a lawful or unlawful warrior. This was an outcome of the politicization of the army during the height of the terror phase in the course of the revolution. In 1794, under relentless pressure from foreign invaders and domestic anti-revolutionaries, the French National Convention announced a "no quarter" policy in its wars against the British and Hanoverians.<sup>xxx</sup> The British and their Hanoverian allies were singled out as the main enemies of the revolution; the "no quarter" policy was justified on the basis that these two were the enemies of humanity for the threats they

made against the liberties of men, which made them morally unequal to the revolutionaries in France. Robespierre said, on the same occasion, that: "Those who make war on a people to halt the progress of liberty and destroy the rights of man must be attacked, not as ordinary enemies, but as assassins and rebel brigands", and the French took advantage of a whole range of the usual class and racial symbols to establish the position of Britain as the enemy of civilization and peace by calling it the modern Carthage and the country of oppressive oligarchs.<sup>xxx</sup> As the laws of war are based on an explicit condition of reciprocity, it was not surprising for the British to threaten to abandon the laws and customs of war in their military campaigns against the menace of a revolution that, due to its plundering ideology, was an attempt to subvert the civilization.<sup>xxxii</sup>

Despite harsh political rhetoric and the image of an apocalyptic confrontation between humanity and its enemies that both sides resorted to, "no quarter" was never put into practice and the most basic laws of war survived the ordeal of the French revolution and its radicalism. One reason for this was that Robespierre's successors were obsessed with the question of discipline and rigid command hierarchy in the popular army and local militias, without which they would be not much different from an irregular, thus illegitimate, military force in the service of chaos and lawlessness. After the end of the terror phase in the French Revolution, the new regime quickly began to professionalize its armies by turning them into a regularized military organization in which discipline was imposed from above. The French army, while still different from other European armies in structure and organization, got rid of many earlier innovations, such as electing officers through the votes of the rank and file. Along with the moves to make the military organization more regular, the previous rhetoric concerning the new categories of combatants based on political ideologies and nationalities was rapidly discarded. These developments, as mentioned above, finally led to a new emphasis on discipline and professionalization in the armies that favored merit over blood, greatly affected the 19<sup>th</sup> century's military philosophy regarding the distinction between the regular and the irregular.

The revolutionary regime never implemented its rhetoric against external enemies; the situation was different in regard to internal rebels. The revolution unleashed a wave of popular resistance against central authority that met its climax in the case of a conservative and royalist insurgency in the country's western provinces. The republicanist historiography of the 19<sup>th</sup> century tended to depict the insurgency in Vendée

as a conspiracy by the priests and feudals in order to delegitimize genuine popular grievances against a heavy-handed revolutionary regime;<sup>xxxiii</sup> but in fact, what happened in Vendee was an opportunity for the revolutionary army to realize the necessity of discipline and central command for differentiation between popular armies and guerrilla insurgencies. While believing in opposing political ideologies, both the revolutionary army and the rebels looked for ideology as the source of inspiration for war, and they both frequently resorted to irregular, even terror, tactics against each other.

During a long campaign that has been described as Europe's most violent conflict since the Thirty Years Wars in the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century and its first modern genocide<sup>xxxiv</sup> The revolutionary regime committed horrible atrocities that ranged from drowning insurgents in the frosted waters of the Loire to the mass murder of women and children, mass deportation of rebel families, burning and confiscating properties, and seizing cattle and crops. The regime's counterinsurgency in Vendee cost the lives of between 150.000 to 200.000 people, directly or indirectly; it is notable, however, that the most brutal episodes of atrocities were confined to the early stages of the rebellion when the hardliner revolutionaries led by Robespierre were still in power in Paris.<sup>xxxv</sup>

Despite similarities between the belligerents in tactics and even military organization, at least in the first stages of the conflict, the revolutionary regime insisted on projecting a different image of its opponent in official propaganda. Descriptions of the combat methods of the rebels, including the ambush and hit-and-run tactics, were reminiscent of the way American natives were fighting with European settlers and colonial armies. The regime's attitudes toward the Vendee insurgents were summarized in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century by Victor Hugo, who described them as a sort of invisible threat, "unseen armies snaked under and around the republican armies". Such images of the adversary could profoundly influence the way military tactics against them were formulated. Francois-Nicolas Salomon, a commander of the revolutionary armies, asserted in 1793: "Since this is a war of brigands, we must become brigands ourselves. We must ... forget all military rules".<sup>xxxvi</sup> If Vendee was, indeed, the first modern counterinsurgency, it is hardly surprising that many elements of COIN, including the constructed image of the enemy and the view that the only way to counter the enemy is to become like it, owe their origins to that experience.

At any rate, Vendee left two military and legal legacies for the future of modern COIN. On the one hand, it showed that fighting the insurgents would follow a vastly different set of military requirements from that of conventional warfare exemplified in the famous quote of Salomon above. This realization coincided with significant military developments during the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras wars. From the early 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, conventional warfare became more sophisticated than before in terms of the size of the armies, mortality as a result of wars, the complexity of maneuvers, and logistical needs. COIN, as a branch of the emerging concept of small war, was regarded as an inferior and insignificant form of armed conflict in which the practitioners were much less professional than their counterparts in larger, conventional, and inter-state wars. The view that generals and soldiers who were experts in such kinds of war were generally not qualified for more superior forms of conflicts appeared in the same period but grew much stronger in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>xxxvii</sup>

On the other hand, the revolutionary regime formulated a response to the irregular insurgency that rested not merely on military means but also on criminal code and law enforcement mechanisms. From the very beginning of the rebellion in Vendee, the French National Convention decreed that military tribunals should be established to put "highway robbers" and "brigands" on trial. A law enacted in January 1798 imposed capital punishment on those whom these military tribunals would convict.<sup>xxxviii</sup> This amounted to a total militarization of the civil justice system that had persisting effects on the history of modern COIN.<sup>xxxix</sup> By making irregular insurgents equal to ordinary criminals, the modern state found a way to exclude internal COIN from the laws of war.

Vendee was a case of internal insurgency. The French territorial expansion during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars gave modern COIN a new external characteristic and turned it into a campaign of suppressing resistance against the empire. The French faced such challenges from the 1790s until 1815 in many conquered regions, but the most severe one happened in Spain. The rebellion in Spain was different from Vendee in that it took place outside France's national borders, yet the Napoleonic regime was not hesitant in taking advantage of the same universal discourse that the revolutionaries had used against the Vendees. The external COIN in Spain, like Vendee, was depicted as a campaign against "briganders" and was confronted with the same military-legal tools that denied the legitimacy of the rebels' political cause while emphasizing

the criminal nature of their activities. The result was summary killing, extra-legal detentions, and trials at military tribunals where harsh sentences could be given without care for the due process of law.

In actuality, what was happening in Spain was a massive popular uprising against foreign occupation. The insurgents were supported by the British stationed in neighboring Portugal. The miscalculated French strategy of keeping its forces inside barracks to avoid direct confrontation in the countryside and mountainous regions made the supply and communication routes vulnerable to ambushes by the Spanish guerrillas. Frustration over such setbacks and the heavy human tolls drove the French army toward brutality and terror. Their approach manifested in collective punishments for refusing to supply fighting men and paying taxes, confiscation of properties, deportation, and even execution for failure to cooperate with the occupation forces and the local civil servants who worked for them. The legal tools in countering the insurgency consisted of laws enacted for suppressing political activities, limiting the number of people who could congregate in public, controlling social interactions, putting on trial at military tribunals the priests who refused to support the French-backed regime publicly, and surveillance through an army of informants who reported any suspicious or seditious action in churches and public places.<sup>xi</sup>

For most of the period of occupation, the French were vacillating between a strategy of scorch-the-earth in response to bands of guerrillas hidden in the mountains and something closer to winning the hearts and minds of the local people through reforms aimed at modernization, administrative effectiveness, and social progress. Both strategies failed to accomplish any results due to an overwhelming mood of illegitimacy, anger, and hostility among the Spanish. The outcome of the occupation of a backward neighboring country for a superpower with a powerful conventional and disciplined army in addition to an attractive universalistic ideology at its back was between 200.000 and 300.000 losses and final withdrawal.<sup>xli</sup>

The French attitudes toward the Spanish guerrilla were not much different from the Vendees. They branded all bands of insurgents as brigands and treated them accordingly. The fact remained, however, that the Spanish national resistance went beyond any class divisions and comprised of various social sectors such as peasants, urban poor, landowners, and priests who joined the guerrilla war for both nationalist

and religious motivations coupled with grievances toward the French socio-economic policies. Militarily, there was no clear-cut distinction between regular and irregular bands of insurgents since, after the occupation, many soldiers of Spain's regular army deserted and joined the guerrillas. While many of the bands were more than ready to resort to atrocious methods against the occupation forces, there were still vast differences between them not only in terms of their socio-economic backgrounds but also in organization, tactics, and willingness to respect the laws of war.

The French insisted that all the insurgents were brigands and cruel savages, yet they also recognized these differences and realized the benefits of reciprocity where guerrilla bands showed their readiness to treat the captured French forces with dignity. Over time and in some cases, the occupation forces acquiesced to treat some insurgent bands more leniently, provided that they do the same regarding captured French soldiers. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the changes in the attitudes somehow coincided with a general shift in the organization and military tactics of the insurgents from 1808 onwards. What made this transition possible was the efforts of the Spanish government under occupation to regularize the activities of various insurgents throughout the country and the active material support of foreign powers like Britain that gave a semblance of central command, strict hierarchy, and discipline to them, reflected even in the shift toward more conventional military tactics toward the end of the occupation.<sup>xlii</sup>

The age of democratic revolutions and their aftermath is considered a critical turning point in creating the image of the lawless irregular fighter who was undisciplined, criminal, and under no one's command. This notion of the threatening, yet inferior, nature of the enemy inevitably affected legal definitions and categories of combatants and the laws concerning their treatment during armed conflict situations. However, the historical cases of insurgencies in this period demonstrate how inaccurate and strange to reality was the identity attributed to irregular insurgents. Still, the negative characteristics of indiscipline, violence, and fighting for personal gains rather than a legitimate political cause or public good were necessary to establish an opposite identity for the emerging popular armies of the modern states. These highly politicized military institutions were different from their predecessors in their organization and were not in any way less atrocious in conducting war than irregular forces. Still, the contrast was reflected in the centrality of rigid command structure, discipline, and conventional military tactics that were deemed to be essential to maintain

the dichotomy between a politically legitimate military organization and an illegitimate, irregular one that came to dominate much of the military thinking of the later centuries.

## The Colonial Connection

Colonial insurgencies in the 19<sup>th</sup> century were the continuation of an old pattern of opposition to imperial rule.<sup>xliii</sup> But still, they constituted a vital element in the development of modern COIN because the sharp distinction between the continental and small wars and their respective doctrines, strategies, tactics, training, and arms owed its existence to the confrontations between the Europeans and non-Europeans in the colonies and the globalization of the European state system in that period.<sup>xliv</sup> Two contradictory trends mark the global history of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. On the one hand, the Europeans were vigorously expanding their colonial empires due to perceived economic benefits or rivalries among great powers; on the other hand, the military, financial and moral costs of small wars necessary for these imperial conquests and policing created a backlash against them.

The years between the French Revolution and the fall of Napoleon in 1815 were the height of large, conventional warfare in Europe of such magnitude that provided an incentive for Clausewitz to write his epochal treatise on war. The lull that ensued in such conflicts after 1815 released the European energies for another kind of military adventure. However, while sophisticated technical and organizational skills characterized the continental wars of Europe for the emerging mass armies, small wars seemed to be tactically and technically rudimentary. The consolidation of the trend toward strict discipline following the French Revolution's failed attempts at egalitarian innovations in the organization and operation of popular armies coincided with the realization that the same principles were not needed in the colonial wars. It created contempt for small wars among many sectors of the conventional armies that had recently gotten used to complex command structures, rigid formations, operation maps, exact orders, and enormous logistics appropriate to the era of industrialization and protracted wars. Small war practitioners became outcasts relegated to the margins of military organizations.<sup>xlv</sup>

Colonialism left a legacy of assumptions and approaches for contemporary COIN. The practitioners of the 19<sup>th</sup> century small wars defined it as a distinct type of armed conflict with a particular set of



features and requirements befitting its main function as a tool to create and secure fragile empires whose survival depended on the compulsion and exploitation of the local populations. Unlike the settler colonialism of early modern European history with its genocidal aspects of expulsion and destruction of the natives to clear the land for habitation and agriculture by the Europeans, the 19<sup>th</sup>-century imperialism was mainly a mechanism through which the European state system globalized itself by integrating the rest of the world into its network of economic and political relations. This imperialism aspired to expand the capitalist models of trade, production, and economic organization by exploiting the natural resources and cheap labor force in other continents rather than destroying and annihilating the native populations.

Yet, ambitious projects of territorial expansion can hardly be sustained without a moral purpose. European imperialism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was justified as a humanitarian effort intended to bring the benefits of modernity and enlightenment to the rest of the world. The relatively advanced Herero, Nama and Ovamba civilizations that the Germans encountered in their Southwestern African colonies did not stop them from branding the natives as uncivilized. Despite the differences in the level of socio-economic and political sophistication and organization among the various Muslim and non-Muslim societies in the German East African possessions, the practice of slave trade in the coastal Muslim kingdom of Zanzibar gave the Germans a perfect excuse to justify their imperialist-civilizing mission.<sup>xlvi</sup>

In the case of Russia, despite the settler colonialist nature of earlier phases of territorial expansion since the 16<sup>th</sup> century marked by massive confiscation of properties and lands and forced relocation and conversion to Christianity of the local inhabitants, the later stages of conquests in Caucasia and Central Asia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century were carried out with clear military and economic considerations in mind.<sup>xlvi</sup> The ideological component of this project resorted to a cultural-moral argument that stigmatized the nomadic lifestyle as unproductive, uncivilized, and ultimately inhumane that needed to be eradicated to clear the way for an inevitable and universal modernization.<sup>xlvi</sup>

Another legacy of colonialism for contemporary COIN is the notion of an existential threat in the peripheries of the European/civilized international system that should be contained with war and conquest. The fanatical enemies in the backward peripheries of the European state system

were both a bulwark toward the expansion of the universal modern values and trade and threats to the security of the civilized nations. Again Russian imperialism offers a case in point. The massive Russian program of ethnic cleansing in the mountainous regions of northern Caucasia in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century that led to the forced relocation of about 700.000 and the death of another 1-1.5 million people,<sup>xlix</sup> was motivated in large part by concerns over possible collaboration between the local Muslim populations and hostile foreign powers such as the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, and France. Likewise, the war of conquest in Central Asia led, in just one incident, to the massacre of 14.000 enemy combatants and civilians amid the Great Game between the Russian and British empires in the heart of Asia.<sup>1</sup> Yet the atrocities were also influenced by a widespread belief that the warlike nature of the unenlightened and semi-savage Muslim inhabitants in both regions made them unfit to live inside the borders of the Russian empire. As there was practically no way to incorporate these "dangerous, volatile, unreliable and useless" people into the empire by friendly and gentle means, the Russians decided to divide the local populations into two categories.<sup>li</sup> Those who would succumb peacefully to the Russian lifestyle and governance institutions and those who would resist; the latter were targeted by massacre and forced relocation to pave the way for peace, flourishing of trade, and the comforts of modern life.

The war to contain existential threats of uncivilized forces in the peripheries followed the rules and principles that would distinguish the colonial COIN as the main form of small/irregular war of the 19<sup>th</sup> century from the large, conventional ones fought among European nation-states. In a war with enemies who were culturally and morally (not to mention racially) inferior to Europeans, the rules and tactics of civilized warfare would not work. Such wars only followed the absolute necessity of the evil, uncivilized enemy's total annihilation.

In one of the first significant examples of colonial COIN, General Bugeaud, commander of the French army in Algier in the 1830s and 1840s, advised his troops to: "forget those orchestrated and dramatic battles that civilized people fight against one another, and realize that unconventional tactics are the soul of this war". Bugeaud insisted that modern weapons and the cumbersome means of transportation in continental warfare were ineffective in a colonial context. Instead, he favored an approach that could speed up the movement of the French colonial army so that it could be more responding to the necessities of highly mobile irregular wars. The critiques of Bugeaud were accusing his strategy of fighting the native guerrillas on

their own terms as more like a "manhunt" than war and an outrageous contradiction to the Napoleonic decisive battle paradigm so central to the whole military philosophy of the day.<sup>lii</sup> The Germans' rapid program of dismantling the socio-economic structures of the native societies in their Southwestern African colonies led to the 1904 uprising and its brutal suppression. Lothar von Trotha, the commander of the German expeditionary force, adopted what he called a "radical war" against the rebel Herero fighters. In a military order issued in October 1904, Von Trotha warned that he would shoot any Herero, including women and children, that dared to remain within the borders of German colonies.<sup>liii</sup> When confronted with an illusive, mobile, and highly invisible enemy during the Second Boer War, the British adopted drastic measures such as burning down villages and crops and setting up concentration camps to separate the civilian populations from the Afrikan fighters. This last policy led to the death of about 28.000 civilians.<sup>liv</sup>

Military tactics and weapons were not the only things that distinguished the small colonial war from the conventional European ones. The former required a different type of agents and soldiers, as well. While disciplined, professional soldiers would have fought the conventional warfare among civilized nations, the colonial war as the linkage between battle, diplomacy, and imperial governance needed practitioners equipped with highly diverse lingual, cultural, managerial, and diplomatic skills. A small warrior not only had to put his diplomatic acumen into practice in regard to native societies over which he wanted to rule, but he also had to use those skills in order to manage a potentially tenuous and hostile relationship with civil institutions in the Metropolis. Discipline, respect for the civilian jurisdiction, oversight, or the conventional understandings of military professionalism had no place among the repertoire of talents such a warrior should have possessed. In many cases, such divergent professional ethos would result in mutual hatred and mistrust between the personnel of the conventional sectors of the army and the small war practitioners.

Knowing the enemy was an integral component of Bugeaud's strategy in Algier because he was obliged to win the cooperation of some native tribes to control and police the others. Under his command, the French were ready to grant a high level of freedom in internal affairs to those social groups who would succumb to colonial rule. Cultural appeasement and respect for local sensitivities were the other sides of the coin of forced relocation, hard labor, and mass murder against the recalcitrants.<sup>lv</sup>

German imperialism was notorious for the hostile relationship between the colonial military-administrative establishment and the civil government and society back home. The lack of strong civilian control over the army in Germany meant that the German colonial army had a freer hand in committing atrocities in the African colonies. Yet, the pressure of international public opinion forced the German government to demand the strengthening of civilian oversight in the aftermath of the 1904 rebellions in both Southwestern and Eastern African possessions. During those uprisings, Von Trotha had argued that the German army would only answer to the Kaiser,<sup>lvi</sup> while it would take no orders from the civilian government led by Chancellor Von Bulow. While the political establishment in Berlin and the German businesses hated Von Trotha for his genocidal policies that could undermine the economic plans for the African colonies, the militarization of the colonial ruling establishment in the German African territories and its dodging of civilian oversight continued until the end of the German presence in the continent.

Immersion into the local cultures was most evident in the case of the Russian and American imperialisms. Many Russian soldiers and agents stationed in Caucasia during the 19<sup>th</sup> century adopted, over time, the clothes, social norms, and behavior patterns of the mountainous people they were supposed to civilize. The romanticized image of the noble savage loomed large in the popular literature of both Russia and the United States.<sup>lvii</sup> The imitation of the character, morale and even the fighting styles of the savages by European and American small warriors contributed a lot to the backlash against them among the more conventional sectors of the armies.

Colonial COIN in the 19<sup>th</sup> century left a legacy of compulsion and occupation administered by a system in which the lines of distinction between the military and civilian jurisdictions had been blurred. The agents in the service of such ruling systems were soldier-administrators whose job was to sell the idea of their civilizing mission to the public opinion and civilian authority back at home. Their information campaign was successful for many decades as very few in Europe remained skeptical about the prospects of improved living conditions that imperialism promised to savages.

Toward the end of the century, sporadic turbulences in the colonies and the rising defense costs of maintaining a permanent military-police machine to secure the empires convinced some Europeans that the

incorrigible, ungratifying, recalcitrant colonial subjects were not willing to embrace the gifts of modernity. The realization that imperialism's civilizing mission was expensive and hopeless came when European political developments became more menacing than whatever existential threats small warriors claimed to contain in the colonies. The reunification of Germany in 1871 intensified inter-state rivalries in the continent at a time when the industrial revolution, technological advances, and mass armies had made war a much more destructive business than it was a century ago. While the small colonial war faced both a backlash at home and the redirection of resources toward continental wars, imperialism did not lose its significance in the great power games as it became one of the major elements in the chain of factors contributing to World War I. Furthermore, The backlash against small warriors was not just about contempt for their military doctrine or the rising costs of their civilizing projects. The moral costs of COIN's half-military, half-political strategies to subjugate the colonial subjects also became increasingly apparent.

### What Makes Coin Violent?

Discussions of war atrocities in the COIN and irregular warfare literature seem to be divided between two grand theories. One, exemplified by the standard of civilization literature, argues that ideational factors such as ideological animosity, notions of racial and cultural inferiority, or moral hatred toward the enemy cause excessive, unnecessary violence against an adversary that has not even been recognized as a legitimate opponent. The other theory points out that violence is a military strategy that pursues the objective of a particular type of conflict different from conventional warfare, and it should be fought on its own terms.

Studying Russia's long COIN in Northern Caucasia from the 1840s to 1860s, Robert Geraci dismissed various theories that sought to explain the exterminatory nature of that campaign in terms of military concerns, economic necessities, or the organizational culture of the Russian imperial armies.<sup>lviii</sup> He wrote that a moral-cultural component contributed as much as security-economic considerations in facilitating genocidal atrocities that the Russian Empire committed against Muslim tribes in the mountains of Northern Caucasia. While the violence was happening within the context of a military operation to put its own rebellion against imperial rule, it was

justified and made sense within a broader program of social planning to build a modern, civilized society.

In explaining why theories based on military logic are inadequate, Dirk Moses referred to the differences between colonial and inter-state wars.<sup>lix</sup> Violence as a military strategy is bound to remain physical, but colonial atrocities are also about erasing the cultural manifestations of the native life that are not understandable from a purely military point of view. Imperialism is not an ordinary type of conquest because it follows a civilizing or nation-building mission in which the cultural diversity or political autonomy in the peripheries would be eliminated by military force. The more intense the colonial rule is, the more violent it should be expected to be. Moses argued that colonial war does not end with the military defeat of the opponents and the annexation of territories. The conquered society's entire socio-economic structure must be transformed to prepare it for exploitation. Genocidal violence happens in colonial warfare because the objective of war is to secure the obedience of the colonial subject; their right to resistance would not only remain unrecognized, but it would be responded to by eradication and elimination.

In contrast, a wide range of works investigates the excessive violence of COIN primarily in terms of a military strategy and its usefulness for achieving war goals. Douglas Porch emphasized the differences between the scorch-the-earth campaign of General Bugeaud in Algiers with Napoleonic paradigm of decisive warfare to conclude that the French war practices in the colony were an ultimately failed military strategy to break the local resistance against imperial rule.<sup>lx</sup> Bugeaud's strategy based on four principles of mobility, morale, leadership, and firepower, setting up patrol units to identify bands of resistance and employing rapid force against them was dictated by his understanding that the only way to win the war was by becoming "more Arabs than the Arabs". In practice, his tactics mainly consisted of attacks against civilian targets through internment, resettlement, curfews, collective punishments, destruction of villages and properties, food control, cutting down trees, rape, and murder which were not only serious crimes but also smashed the local economy. However, they had their own military advantages.

Bugeaud's strategy relieved some logistical problems and concerns about the safety of communication and supply routes by making the colonial army highly mobile. His economic practices of confiscating properties, crops, and cattle destroyed the local economy and paved the way for

colonizing Algiers by European settlers. It also helped the colonial army to acquire an independent source of revenue which in turn lessened its budgetary dependence on the Metropol and its various democratic mechanisms of civilian control such as parliamentary or public opinion oversight.<sup>lxi</sup>

Edward J. Erickson follows the same view in *A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare*. He argues that the policy of forced relocation of the population is based on a strategic consideration derived from calculating how to counter a military threat in a stressful armed conflict situation. Operationally and tactically, forced relocation deprives the insurgents of their main source of support, makes it easier for the counterinsurgent force to identify the rebels, weakens the enemy, and contributes positively to the efforts to root out rebellion.<sup>lxii</sup> J. L. Hazelton also maintains that violence directed toward armed rebels and civilian populations can be useful, even inevitable, in COIN. A counterinsurgency is a costly form of war both in terms of financial and human loss, and often it needs to be carried out without regard for moral scruples since the ultimate purpose is to impose or guarantee the desired order or the security of great powers.<sup>lxiii</sup>

Finally, Sibylle Scheipers explored the British and German colonial warfares in 19<sup>th</sup> century Africa to assert that the special conditions of each military confrontation determine the level of violence, either randomly or systematically. Atrocious practices such as summary executions, mass murder, torture, internment, and destruction of livelihoods are almost always ordered and carried out by army units directly involved in hostilities. Policies such as setting up concentration camps or forced relocation of local populations inflicted horrible human suffering, but they were adopted in some cases, without genocidal intentions, based only on strategic and operational needs dictated by war conditions.<sup>lxiv</sup>

Are these two grand theories inherently incompatible? Or is there a way to reconcile their basic elements into an integrated framework? Colonel Callwell had once said that conventional armies fear nothing more than guerrillas.<sup>lxv</sup> Irregular warfare is not exclusive to any time, space or ideology. It is the preferred form of armed conflict whenever and wherever a weaker party seeks to challenge a militarily superior power. What makes COIN violent is certain features of this form of war that distinguish it from conventional one. The Clausewitzian paradigm is based on identifying a center of command and control whose capture or destruction would end the

war decisively. In irregular conflicts, there are no such centers. They are wars among the people intended to control the population, not conquer territories. In order to win, insurgents rely on the element of surprise, morale, good information, and above all, popular support. The counterinsurgent, on the other hand, needs to attack targets deemed important to deprive the enemy of its main source of support, yet their nature as military or civilian can not be readily determined.

In military terms, the most important attribute of irregular warfare is the asymmetry of power between the belligerents. Under such circumstances, the victory formulae for the rebels is to inflict an unacceptable amount of damage to the enemy for a sustained period to break its will to fight. Making war long and attritional can be achieved by avoiding direct engagement with the more powerful counterinsurgent force and relying on surprise, spectacular attacks against vulnerable targets. Thus, irregular insurgency tactics require a number of assets and abilities: 1) mobility and flexibility to organize, act and disperse as fast as possible; 2) reliable information about the enemy's whereabouts, number, and armaments; 3) making contacts and maintain good relations with the local population; 4) right propaganda tools and attractive cause to win popular support; and 5) a secure base to store supplies and train the recruits.

All of these components of a winning insurgency strategy directly or indirectly involve mobility and popular support; thus, it is only natural to assume that a successful counterinsurgency strategy should attempt to offset these assets. Some of the most violent COIN tactics draw their military justification from the same necessity. Isolating the rebels in a specific geographical region and cutting their access to the outside world, which will inevitably lead to hunger and death for the inhabitants of that region, could be necessary for neutralizing the mobility of the irregular fighters. Denying the support of sympathetic local populations would require drastic measures like resettlement or forced relocation.<sup>lxvi</sup> It could also be achieved by organizing local self-defense militias. The problem with this policy, however, is that local militias organized to defend the local population against the rebels' revengeful attacks could become a source of violence and lawlessness themselves.<sup>lxvii</sup> Finally, one of the most crucial weapons in the fight against insurgents is valid and sufficient information. Apart from modern technologies and infiltration inside rebel organizations, the two main sources of acquiring data useful in the war against insurgents are captured rebels and the local population. In both cases, obtaining



information from reluctant prisoners or the population might involve violent means, which often only encourages further hatred and resistance.<sup>lxviii</sup>

What outlined above is a purely a military analysis found in many COIN literature. However, it is not sufficient to understand the causes of violence within this form of warfare. The reason is that insurgency is not just an armed challenge but also a political-moral one against the established order and authority. Inevitably the response to insurgency needs to be formulated both in military and political-moral terms. While the counterinsurgent force can quell such challenges by using military tactics that can become protracted, costly, and full of moral ambiguities in many cases, order and authority should be sustained by moral and legal means. Such means, especially in the context of external COIN, are almost always associated with humanitarian and philanthropic pretensions that justify actions to secure the empire with alleged socio-economic and political benefits to be gained by the local population.

However, COIN strategies' many insurmountable contradictions and fundamental flaws are not just derived from the tension between the empire's security needs and those of the local population. It also stems from the very nature of COIN as a war among the people to control the people. The entire COIN strategy works based on a clear-cut distinction between an enemy whom the counterinsurgent force wants to destroy and the people it seeks to save. Regardless of the amount of violence the special conditions of war might force the counterinsurgent to resort to, the war itself can only begin when that distinction has already been made. This is where COIN transcends from a purely military strategy into a political and moral agenda in which military tactics and practices are highly reflective of underlying moral notions about the nature of the threat and the enemy itself.

The division in the COIN literature between the primacy of material (military, economic) or ideational (cultural, ideological, religious) factors in explaining excessive violence is misguided because they operate based on an assumption of a clear separation between the military necessities and moral hatred. In reality, they both form a mutually reinforcing relationship in which military tactics are developed in response to the moral image of the insurgent as a savage, malicious fighter who has no right to take up arms due to the illegitimacy of his political cause or grievance, while the way the rebels conduct war and the means they take advantage of, are against underlying moral notions about military propriety and the rules of war.

## Conclusion

Moral and legal notions about what is right and in order not only affect socio-cultural understandings of what is legitimate war but also who has the right to take up arms and how war should be conducted. Pre-existing assumptions, closely reflecting class and racial prejudices, have rendered wars waged by enemies such as nomadic tribes, heathen communities, peasants, or slaves illegitimate since ancient times. However, it was not just the status (class, race, beliefs, or lifestyle) that affected the attitudes toward these enemies or the creation of strong norms against them.

Those factors mentioned above are not enough to understand completely the extraordinary level of violence or frightful aberrations from everything humanly that were sometimes seen in the wars between great ancient civilizations and such enemies. A complete understanding requires attention to the second function of moral-legal systems, which is determining the proper and orderly ways and methods of doing things (violations of which will be met with moral reproach or legal sanction). Fighting styles, organization of the armies, battle formations, weapons, and tactics were elements of those proper and orderly ways of doing things when it came to waging wars, and they could greatly affect moral notions about the enemy.

In the modern age, the mutually reinforcing relationship between moral notions about the enemy and the military reality of different fighting styles has found its expression in the concepts of discipline, professionalism, and commandability. Following the advent of modern states with their claim of monopoly over the use of force, war became an armed conflict between states justifiable only in the name of state or national interests. Under such circumstances, any armed action carried out by non-state forces, in a sense determined by the standards of the European Westphalian system, became problematic. Furthermore, states' control over armed forces, technological developments, and concomitant repercussions for the organization of the armies, command structures, and battle formations created a paradigm of conventional warfare. This paradigm slowly evolved during the 18<sup>th</sup> century but found its ultimate form and contour in the century after that. The modern conceptualization of the distinction between regular and irregular war owes its origins to these developments.

Discussions of war atrocities within the context of COIN are usually divided between structural explanations emphasizing the military and strategic factors contributing to violence and ideational theories highlighting moral, racial, or ideological determinants. A deeper study of cruelties in war, however, shows that both these elements mutually reinforce each other. Excessive violence in COIN is a military strategy developed in response to what is perceived to be the particular conditions of a special kind of warfare. Those conditions concern the necessity of countering a threat posed by an incorrigibly lawless enemy whose barbarity and chaotic qualities are reflected in his unnoble and treacherous ways of fighting.

In the modern period, such reinforcing relationship was seen nowhere more vividly than in the case of colonial wars. Under the impression of military orientalism, conflicts in the colonies have almost always (yet somewhat wrongly) been identified with categories of irregular or small wars in contrast to regular, conventional wars in Europe.<sup>lxix</sup> Although the irregular conflict was not invariably the character of the military encounters between the colonizers and the colonized, the Europeans' immutable perception was that the colonial insurgents fought in ways that were antithetical to proper methods of conducting war and, thus, were barbarous and violent beyond any law or limit. Stories about how the fighting style of the colonial rebels was deviating from civilized warfare, real or forged, were used to justify ruthless repression that was presented as a natural, even necessary, adaptation to conditions of irregular colonial warfare.

In light of these, two tasks are set for the next chapter. If it is assumed that COIN is not just a military but also an ideological response to a perceived challenge, the first task for the next chapter will be to explore the mutually reinforcing relationship between moral notions about the nature of the threat and the subjective image of the enemy in COIN, on the one hand, and how differences in fighting styles and the way war is conducted (dictated, in many cases, by sheer military necessities stemming from asymmetries in power) strengthen those subjective understandings of the threat. Both of these are reflected in COIN strategies that are not only military but also moral responses to the enemy with the purpose of securing the world not just for the borders but also for the ideology of empire. The special nature of the enemy and the uniqueness of the threat it poses, both militarily and morally, warrant a range of extraordinary, emergency legal tools that form a vital constitutive element of the COIN strategies. Going beyond normalcy in repelling a military and moral threat,

itself, requires a moral theory to justify and facilitate the violence concomitant with emergency responses. For much of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and even beyond that, such moral theory was the civilizing mission of imperialism and the standard of civilization in dealing with the enemy. In light of the end of old imperialism and its civilizing rhetoric in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, coincided with the birth of IR to interpret a new de-colonized world, the second task set for the next chapter will be exploring IR theories to see whether they provide a modern substitute for the inclusion-exclusion criterion represented, earlier, by the standard of civilization.

<sup>i</sup> Ben Kiernan, *"Blood and Soil"*, p: ...; Lawrence H. Keeley, *"War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage"*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp: 38-69.

<sup>ii</sup> Edward Arthur Thompson, *"The Huns"*, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996), p: 103.

<sup>iii</sup> For instances of the way the Assyrians treated enemies and rebels, see Mark Healy, *"The Ancient Assyrians"*, (New York: Osprey Publications, 1991); Stephen Bertman, *"Handbook to Life in Ancient Mesopotamia"*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p: 268; and Albert Kirk Grayson, *"Assyrian Rulers of the Early First Millennium BC (1114-859 BC)"* volume 2 *"Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia: Assyrian Period"*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p: 201. For a case of gruesome punishments inflicted on rebels in the Persian Empire, see Joshua J. Mark, *"Behistun Inscription"* in *World History Encyclopedia*, (November 28, 2019), [https://www.worldhistory.org/Behistun\\_Inscription/](https://www.worldhistory.org/Behistun_Inscription/) (accessed on August 10, 2022). For two cases of atrocities by the Romans against rebel Jews and slaves, see: Flavius Josephus, *"The Wars of the Jews"*, revised by William Whiston, 6.9.3, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=J.+BJ+6.9.3>; and Philip Matyszak, *"Enemies of Rome: From Hannibal to Attila the Hun"*, illustrated edition (Thames and Hudson, 2009), p: 133.

<sup>iv</sup> Patrick Wolfe discusses the society-led and state-led genocide in Patrick Wolfe, *"Structure and Event: Settler Colonialism, Time, and the Question of Genocide"* in Dirk Moses (ed.), *"Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History"*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp: 102-32.

<sup>v</sup> See Vesselin Popovski, Gregory M. Reichberg, and Nicholas Turner (eds.), *"World Religions and Norms of War"*, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009).

<sup>vi</sup> Hedley Bull defined war as "organized violence carried on by political units against each other" in his *"The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics"*, 3rd edition (Columbia University Press, 2002), p: 184, which shows that in his view only the military conflicts among the belligerents who enjoy a certain degree of political organization as defined and recognized by a community of counterparts are worth the label of war.

<sup>vii</sup> For Islamic law's views about rebellion, see Khaled Fadl, *"Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law"*, Second Edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For a discussion of the Christian depiction of medieval peasant revolts, see Paul Freedman, *"Images of the Medieval Peasant"*, (Stanford University Press, 1999). The traditional Chinese historiography is, also, replete with expressions of moral aversion toward rebels and reiteration of norms against revolting against the established order; see, for example, Hans Van de Ven, "Introduction" in Hans Van de Ven (ed.), *"Warfare in Chinese History"*, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp: 9-10.

<sup>viii</sup> The theory of the military revolution of the early modern age and its influence on the rise of modern states in Europe is primarily the result of Michael Robert's historical research, see: Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660", in Michael Roberts (ed.), *"Essays in Swedish History"*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), pp: 195-225. The implications of this revolution in terms of the organization of modern armies, marginalization of previous irregular fighters such as feudal forces, local militias, or mercenaries that were so central in the conduct of medieval wars and their delegitimization have been discussed by Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime" in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Peter B. Evans and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *"Bringing the State Back In"*, (Cambridge: u Press, 1985), pp: 203-21; and Charles Tilly, *"Coercion, Capital and the European States: 990-1990"*, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990). Yet the whole idea of a military revolution in the early modern age, as well as its alleged consequences, has been criticized more recently by historians. These critiques show the significant contribution of irregular forces in the form of mercenaries or various public-private partnerships, such as the armed bands under the superficial command of central governments yet actual control of aristocrats, in the wars of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The conclusion is that both irregular fighters and irregular tactics of warfare with all its implications in terms of indiscipline and the prevalence of unrestraint violence were common characteristics of 18<sup>th</sup>-century wars, even in Europe itself; see, among other sources, Geoffrey Parker, *"The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800"*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and David Parrott, "Had a Distinct Template for 'Western Way of War' Been Established Before 1800?" in Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (eds.), *"The Changing Character of War"*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp: 48-63.

<sup>ix</sup> For these anti-imperial insurgencies in the 18th century, see Jeremy Black, *"Insurgency and Counterinsurgency"*, pp: 188-194, 197-200, and 210.

- <sup>x</sup> John T. Alexander, *Emperor of the Cossacks: Pugachev and the Cossack Jacqueries of 1773-75*, (Lawrence, Kans.: Coronado Press, 1974).
- <sup>xi</sup> W. Gregory Monahan, *Let God Arise: The War and Rebellion of the Camisards*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- <sup>xii</sup> Jeremy Black, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency", pp: 234-239 and Claire Robertson, "Racism, the Military, and Abolitionism in the Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century Caribbean," *Journal of Military History* 77 (2013), pp: 433-461.
- <sup>xiii</sup> Edward J. Erickson, "introduction" in Edward J. Erickson (ed.), *A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare*, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020); S. Dezfali, "Iran's Constitutional Revolution and Religious Reactions to It", *Asian Social Sciences*, 12/11 (2016), 11-22, [10.5539/ass.v12n11p11](https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v12n11p11).
- <sup>xiv</sup> For an example of these insurgencies known as The Orlov Revolt in Greece, see Leften S. Stevrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, (Hurst, 2000), pp: 185-195.
- <sup>xv</sup> Jeremy Black, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency", pp: 216-17.
- <sup>xvi</sup> John Grenier, *The Far Reaches of Empire: War in Nova Scotia, 1710-1760*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008).
- <sup>xvii</sup> The European powers of this period constantly used irregular methods of warfare in their encounters with peasant rebellions or insurgent movements in mountainous areas. The use of informal or irregular combat units comprised of warlike tribal warriors living in the peripheries of the European civilization as attachments to the conventional armies of states and empires (the Croats serving the Hapsburg armies or Cossacks in the Russian military establishment) was a major form of coexistence between the regular and irregular in the military strategies of the day. B. Heuser even shows how the ethnic name of these warlike people comprising the irregular units operating in a semi-independent way alongside conventional armies (like Hussars or Cossacks) came to denote particular ways of conducting war, see Beatrice Heuser, "Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People's War", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 1 (2010), pp: 139-162, especially page 143.
- <sup>xviii</sup> Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815*, (University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), p: 50.
- <sup>xix</sup> Sibylle Scheipers, *Unlawful Combatants*, p: 35.
- <sup>xx</sup> John Shy explored the unlimited and unrestraint nature of "the American way of war" in John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning", *Journal of Interdisciplinary Research* 1, no. 2 (1971), pp: 205-28. The cruelties associated with this particular type of warfare are the subject of John Grenier, *The First Way of War: The American War Making on the Frontier: 1607-1814*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- <sup>xxi</sup> Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrillas in History*, (London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1976), p: 104.
- <sup>xxii</sup> Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the world, 1600-1850*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 2002), p: 185.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> For the Fort William Henry incident, see Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and Massacre*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p: 78. For cases of indiscipline among European irregulars during Seven Years Wars in North America, see: Francis Jennings, *Empire Of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America*, (W. W. Norton and Company, 1988), p: 199.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> John Eliss, *A shory history of Guerrilla warfare*, (New York: St. Martin's press, 1976), p: 50.
- <sup>xxv</sup> Colonel C. E. Callwell explored the connection between COIN and the emergence of modern democracies in Charles E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principle and Practice*, (Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 1996). John Arquilla studied the French COIN in Spain during the age of Napoleonic wars in Michael Few, "Interview with Dr. John Arquilla: How Can French Encounters with Irregular Warfare in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Inform COIN in Our Time?", *Small Wars Journal*, November 30, 2010, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/608-arquilla.pdf> (accessed July 21, 2022); Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p: 4. See, also, Gregory Fremont-Barnes, "Introduction" in Gregory Fremont-Barnes (ed.), *A History of Counterinsurgency*, Volume 1 *From Southh Africa to Algeria, 1900-1954*, (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2015), p: 2; and Jeremy Black, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency", pp: 239-53.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> Jeremy Black dismisses a few instances of resorting to guerrilla fighting among the American revolutionaries as overly exaggerated myths that, nonetheless, form one of the central themes in

the historiography of the revolution and are reproduced in contemporary popular arts, see: Jeremy Black, *"Insurgency and Counterinsurgency"*, pp: 223-34. Anthony James Joes, on the other hand, believes that the guerrilla war the British faced in South Carolina was more critical in determining the outcome of the war than their defeat at Yorktown, see: Anthony James Joes, *"The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency: Resisting Rebellion"*, (University Press of Kentucky, 2004), pp: 158-59.

<sup>xxvii</sup> Betsy Knight, "Prisoner Exchange and Parole in the American Revolution", *William and Mary Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (1991), pp: 201-222. Still, the British reluctance to adopt a definitive policy in regard to the status of the American revolutionaries and the revolutionaries' insistence that until their independence was recognized, they would not commit to the laws of war in treating captured enemy soldiers meant that the 18<sup>th</sup>-century institution of "prisoners exchange cartels", so common in wars among European states, did not form between the belligerents in this particular case, see: Sibylle Scheiper, *"Unlawful Combatant"*, p: 47.

<sup>xxviii</sup> John shy, "The American Revolution: The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War" in Stephen J. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (eds.), *"Essays on the American Revolution"*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), pp: 155 & 216-7. Furthermore, those occasional resorts to irregular tactics could be forgiven since the British themselves, in keeping with the military tradition of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, would not shy away from using irregular forces such as the famous Tarleton Raiders, who massacred members of a surrendered unit of the revolutionary army in Virginia in 1780, see: Sibylle Scheipers, *"Unlawful Combatants"*, p: 48.

<sup>xxix</sup> An excellent example of this view is David Bell, *"The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare"*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), p: 8.

<sup>xxx</sup> A. D. Harvey, "European Attitudes to Britain During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era", *History* 63, no. 209 (1978), pp: 356-65.

<sup>xxxi</sup> Robespierre's reference in Bell, *"The First Total War"*, pp: 143-4. For the class and racial depictions of Britain in Revolutionary France, see Geoffrey Best, *"War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770-1870"*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982), p: 84.

<sup>xxxii</sup> For British reaction to the French National Convention's "no quarter" policy, see: Philip Scholfield, "British Politicians and French Arms: The Ideological war of 1793-5", *History* 77, no. 250 (1992), pp: 183-201. The British concerns over how the French Revolution threatened civilization were best expressed in Edmund Burke's *"Reflections on the Revolution in France"*.

<sup>xxxiii</sup> Claude petitfrere, "The Origins of the Civil War in the Vendee", *French History* 2, no. 2 (1988), pp: 187-207.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> Gregory Fremont-Barnes, "Introduction", p: 3 and Reynald Secher, *"A French Genocide: The Vendee"*, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003).

<sup>xxxv</sup> The National Convention declared that all the inhabitants of Vendee, men, and women above the age of 12, were rebel sympathizers in order to justify its practice of indiscriminately targeting both the civilians and insurgents, see: Sibylle Scheipers, *"Unlawful Combatants"*, p: 57.

The Thermidorian regime adopted a more conciliatory approach toward the insurgency manifested in changing the field commanders, showing increased tolerance toward the church, declaring general amnesty, restituting the confiscated properties, imposing discipline on the soldiers to control violence, and modifying earlier demands for military service and tax. In his history of counterinsurgency, Callwell described the strategy of the new supreme commander of the counterinsurgent army, General Hoche, as clement. His tone in evaluating the reasons for Hoche's success where his predecessors failed is reminding of more contemporary COIN distinctions of scorch-the-earth vs. wining-the-hearts-and-minds strategies, see Callwell, *"Small Wars"*, p: 147. Still, Hoche's so-called population-centric approach of using mobile patrols and information-gathering units brought the war among the ordinary people and involved the direct occupation of villages and towns by military contingents, forceful disarmament of the farmers, hostage-taking, and even confiscation of properties. The sporadic unrest in Vendee continued until Napoleon's fall and the Bourbon monarchy's restoration in 1815.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> For Hugo's quote, see Scheipers, *"Unlawful Combatants"*, p: 57. For Salomon's reference, see: Bell, *"The First Total War"*, p: 170.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> See Douglas Porch, *"Counterinsurgency"*, pp: 12-13.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Howard G. Brown, *"Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression From the Terror to Napoleon"*, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), p: 143.

xxxix Britain, too, confronted an anti-imperial insurgency by the Irish in 1798, inspired by revolutionary developments in France. Its response to the uprising in Ireland contained the essential components of the later English school in COIN that emphasized a proactive use of the means and mechanisms of legal oppression in responding to insurgencies in colonies and on the fringes of the empire. The British government organized local civil police forces in the form of Protestant Irish Yeomanry, who were soon accused of committing atrocities against both enemy combatants and civilians, see: Daire Keogh and Nicholas Furlong (eds.), *"The Mighty Wave: The 1798 Rebellion in Wexford"*, (Four Courts Press, 1996), p: 28. The British Parliament passed the insurrection act that decreed harsh penalties for insurgents and ordered curfews and police operations to search for concealed weapons. *Habeas Corpus* was also suspended as a result of the emergency situation in Ireland temporarily see: Jeremy Black, *"Insurgency and Counterinsurgency"*, p: 244.

<sup>xi</sup> Sources for Spanish resistance against Napoleon's occupation include Charles Esdaile, *"Fighting Napoleon: Guerrilla, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814"*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); John L. Tone, *"The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain"*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Don Alexander, *"Rod of Iron: French Counterinsurgency in Aragon During the Peninsular War"*, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985).

<sup>xli</sup> Gregory Fremont-Barnes, "Introduction", p: 4 mentions that the losses of the French Army have been estimated to be around 400.000 in some sources. But other sources, including J. Tarnie and J. C. Carmigniani, *"Napoleon's War in Spain"*, translated by Janet Mallender and J. Clements, (London: Arms and Armour, 1982), p: 10 argue that it was about 200.000.

<sup>xlii</sup> Vittorio Scotti-Douglas, "Regulating the Irregulars: Spanish Legislation on *La Guerrilla* During the Peninsular War" in Charles J. Esdaile (ed.), *"Popular Resistance in the French Wars: Patriots, Partisans and land Pirates"*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp: 137-160.

<sup>xliii</sup> Insurgency and counterinsurgency already had a long history in the colonies, as exemplified in the case of the Haitian revolution. It started in 1791 as a slave rebellion; the French decision to abolish slavery in its colonies and grant political rights to non-white subjects in Haiti in 1793 mitigated, at least temporarily, the situation. A new round of conflict and even civil war among the various sectors of the Haitian society began in 1799 when France under Napoleon embarked on a program of reinserting its dominance on the Island and revising the terms of the previous compromises, including through reinstitution of slavery, see: Sibylle Scheipers, *"Unlawful Combatants"*, pp: 148-9. The earlier European historiography unloaded a barrage of racial and civilizational clichés in its portrayal of the revolution in Haiti, even claiming that primitive Vodouist beliefs inspired slaves. Examples of such characterizations in the 19<sup>th</sup>-century European historiography are shown in David Patrick Geggus, *"Haitian Revolutionnary Studies"*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p: 82.

The French government and French settlers' reactions, both in terms of the nature of the atrocities committed against the rebels and the justifications given for them were not so much different from the Vendée case. In the eyes of the French, the revolutionaries were regarded as nothing more than an army of brigands; in the war against such an enemy no rule, including qualm, would be applied. It is worth noting that here again the fighting style of the insurgents and their irregular tactics was a decisive factor in determining the French approach toward them. The commander of the French expeditionary force, Leclerc, had observed that: "we must destroy all the blacks of the mountain"; while the same attitude was also recognizable in the case of the insurgency in Vendée, the exterminatory aspects of the COIN in the colonies, in the decades to come, was closely associated with an emerging assumption that irregular warfare was the way uncivilized people fight. Laurent Dubois discusses the Haitian revolutionaries' military tactics, including the guerrilla method of hiding in the mountains when chased by a more powerful force. The rebel slaves used atrocious tactics in their strikes against the enemy forces and the local population (mostly settler-landowners). The French response in targeting the black elderly, women, and children by punishments such as cutting the ears or beheading the suspects was not so much different from Vendée's.

Nevertheless, the campaign in Haiti had another facet that became a necessary component of the military strategy in the colonies during later centuries. In Haiti, the French enlisted other social classes to suppress the rebels; they even recruited groups of black slaves, with the promise of freedom, to fight their fellow slaves. The purpose was not simply a policy of divide and rule, as an underlying assumption about the benefits of such an approach was that the way these uncivilized



insurgents were fighting was not easily inimitable by the civilized Europeans; thus, the people from the same racial or social group who were familiar with their fighting style should be enlisted; see, Laurent Dubois, *"Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution"*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp: 101, 116, 140 and 291 (for Leclerc's reference).

Dominik J. Schaller, "From Conquest to Genocide: Colonial Rule in German Southwest Africa and German East Africa" in Dirk Moses (ed.), *"Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History"*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp: 296-324.

<sup>xliv</sup> Colonial warfare was not, by any means, the only form of small or irregular warfare during the 19th century. In addition to a wide range of nationalist, anti-imperial, and even urban insurgencies in Europe itself, Latin American states witnessed a host of coup d'etats and rebellions. In the same period, the United States and The United Kingdom saw some of the first examples of using military force to clamp down on the rising class of urban wage workers. The intentional targeting of civilians with lethal weapons, mass and summary executions, and murdering or mistreating of prisoners were some of the primary forms of atrocities during these situations, see: Jeremy Black, *"The Age of Total War, 1860-1945"*, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp: 49-50.

<sup>xliv</sup> Douglas Porch, *"Counterinsurgency"*, pp: 41-6.

<sup>xlv</sup> Dominik J. Schaller, "From Conquest to Genocide: Colonial Rule in German Southwest Africa and German East Africa" in Dirk Moses (ed.), *"Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History"*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp: 296-324.

<sup>xlvii</sup> L. A. Gagemeister, the director of the Russian Ministry of Finance's chancellery in the 1850s, had argued in a report that changing the dominant lifestyle from nomadism to agriculture in Caucasia was vital to the economic interests and needs of the empire. The local nomads had to either abandon their herds and become sedentary peasants or be expelled from the empire if proven (like the Kurds) to be incapable of settlement, see: Robert Geraci, "Genocidal Impulses and Fantasies in Imperial Russia" in Dirk Moses (ed.), *"Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History"*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp: 343-71.

<sup>xlviii</sup> Young Dostoevsky was a strong supporter of Russian imperialism as an essentially civilizing, empathetic, and philanthropic mission and different from the arrogant, greedy, and self-interested European imperialism in its generosity, benevolence, and cultural understanding, see Fyodor Dostoevsky, *"A Writer's Diary"*, Vol. 2 (1877-1881), (Northwestern University Press, 1997), pp: 1272-3, 1294, and 1373-75. Russian imperialism's cultural component was, in some important ways, different from the European ones in that its ultimate goal was to fully integrate colonial subjects into the Metropolis society as a unified nation. This imperialism should have been justified as a benign, natural, and organic expansion of a homogeneous and united Russian nation-state in which bringing the benefits of modernity was tantamount to forced Russification of the colonial subjects. In other words, the genocidal aspects of Russian imperialism rather than its economic or political gains remained to be the most important component well into the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries; the difference with earlier phases of expansion was that in later centuries the genocidal aspects were directed more toward the lifestyles and cultures of the colonial subjects rather than their biological lives, see: Robert Geraci, "Genocidal Impulses", p: 362.

<sup>xlix</sup> For various estimates about the actual number of human losses during decades of insurgency in northern Caucasia from the 1820s to 1860s, compare Peter Holquist, "To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia" in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (eds.), *"A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin"*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp: 111-44 and Stephen D. Shenfield, "The Circassians: A Forgotten Genocide?" in Mark Levene and Penny Roberts (eds.), *"The Massacre in History"*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), pp: 149-62.

<sup>i</sup> For the Gok Tepe massacre in 1881, see Peter Hopkirk, *"The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia"*, (New York: Kodansha International, 1992), pp: 153-62.

<sup>ii</sup> Robert Geraci, "Genocidal Impulses", p: 350.

<sup>iii</sup> Douglas Porch, *"Counterinsurgency"*, pp: 17 & 20.

<sup>iiii</sup> Schaller, "From Conquest to Genocide", p: 304. The term 'scorch the earth' that describes policies of total destruction of the enemy's properties and resources in COIN, was first used in reference to the campaign against another rebellion at the same time in German Eastern African

possessions, see Gilbert Gwassa, "German Intervention and African Resistance in Tanzania" in Isaria N. Kimambo and Arnold J. Temu (eds.), *A History of Tanzania*, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), pp: 85-122.

<sup>liv</sup> Stowell V. Kessler, "The Black and Coloured Concentration Camps" in Fransjohan Pretorius (ed.), *Scorched Earth*, (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 20010), pp: 135-37.

<sup>lv</sup> Gregory Fremont-Barnes, "Introduction", pp: 10-12.

<sup>lvi</sup> German Civilian officials thought Von Trotha was unworthy of his post, but the German high command, unconcerned with their country's international image, trusted him. More importantly, Kaiser Wilhelm II preferred ruthless, reckless military methods manifested in his staunch support for Von Trotha's taking complete control over both civilian and military jurisdictions during the 1904 revolt in German Southwestern African colonies. His views were also made public in a speech given before the soldiers of the German expeditionary force to put down the Boxers' revolt in China, in which he said: "No qualm will be given! Prisoners will not be taken! Whoever falls into your hands is forfeited", see: Schaller, "From Conquest to Genocide", p: 305.

<sup>lvii</sup> Susan Layton, *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus: From Pushkin to Tolstoy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), for example, discusses the image of the noble savage in Pushkin's "The Prisoner of the Caucasus". Mikhail Lermontov called the Russian soldiers stationed in the Caucasus "Kavkazets" which means Caucasian, and described them as half Russian, half Asiatics who prefer the Eastern "simple, primitive life over the urban existence", see: Mikhail Lermontov, "A Hero of Our Time", translated by. Martin Parker, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), <https://ia600209.us.archive.org/21/items/MikhailLermontovAHeroOfOurTime/Mikhail-Lermontov-%20A-Hero-Of-Our-Time.pdf>.

<sup>lviii</sup> Robert Geraci, "Genocidal Impulses".

<sup>lix</sup> A. Dirk Moses, "Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History" in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History*, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp: 3-54; Dezfuli, S. K. (2023). Targeted killings and the erosion of international norm against assassination. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 39(2), 191-206. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2185947>.

<sup>lx</sup> Douglas Porch, "Counterinsurgency", pp: 16-29.

<sup>lxi</sup> Porch, "Counterinsurgency", pp: 23-4.

<sup>lxii</sup> Erickson, "Introduction".

<sup>lxiii</sup> Hazelton, "Bullets, Not Ballots", p: 14.

<sup>lxiv</sup> Scheipers, "Unlawful Combatant", Chapter 5, pp: 146-187.

<sup>lxv</sup> Callwell, "Small Wars", p: 126.

<sup>lxvi</sup> Faced with the Cristero rebellion in the 1920s, the Mexican government resettled about a million rural population in the country's Western provinces, see Jean A. Meyer, *The Cristero Rebellion*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976). The British resorted to the same policy in two notable cases of COIN during the Second Boer War at the beginning of the 20th century and Malaya in the middle of that century, see Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War*, (New York: Random House, 1979) and Edgar O'Ballance, *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War*, (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1966). These are three successful COIN in which drastic measures were adopted to limit the contact between the rebels and local populations. Notable failure cases include Spanish COIN in Cuba in the 1890s and the American Strategic Hamlet Program during the Vietnam War, see Anthony James Joes, *The History and Politics*, pp: 108-9.

<sup>lxvii</sup> Notable examples of violence perpetrated by local self-defense militias against both the rebels and civilian populations include the case of Guatemala in the 1960s to 1980s, Peru in the 1990s, and Colombia in its COIN against the FARC insurgents, see Caesar Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala" in Geroge Fauriol (ed.), *Latin American Insurgencies*, (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 1985), p: 121; Fernando Cubides, "From Private to Public Violence: The Paramilitaries" in Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez (eds.), *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000*, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2001), p: 127; and Cynthia McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path*, (Washington DC: US. Institute of Peace, 1998), p: 185.

<sup>lxviii</sup> When the Algerian National Liberation Front resorted to terrorist tactics in the late 1950s, the French colonizers started torturing the captured rebels to acquire the necessary information to abort terrorist attacks against European targets and settlers. Their practice only led to further support for the FLN among the native Muslim population while creating a moral backlash back

home, see: Joes, "*The History and Politics*", pp: 151-3.

<sup>lxix</sup> Richard J. Reid, "*Warfare in African History*" (New Approaches to African History Series Number 6), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p: 120.